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HECKLER'S VETO CASE LAW AS A RESOURCE
FOR DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE
Cheryl A. Leanza *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost forty years ago, Jerome Barron proposed a listener-centered
First Amendment right.' He argued that the central concern of the First
Amendment should be with the listeners-that difficult questions of
competing First Amendment rights should be resolved with the goal of
2
increasing the viewpoints to which listeners are exposed. While that
approach remains an important part of the existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence with respect to First Amendment analysis of broadcasting,
the Court rejected its application to newspapers, and has not expanded
the approach beyond broadcasting. 3 Many legal scholars and policymakers nonetheless remain concerned about the current law as it applies
to the mass media, raising concerns that it grants too much power to the
attention to the public, to the
owners of media, and pays insufficient
4
serves.
media
that
viewers
and
listeners
While a listener-oriented First Amendment interest is one way to
promote more democratic discourse in media regulation, unfortunately,
advocates have not successfully persuaded the courts to adopt this
approach. Another alternative to improve democratic discourse would be
to look to theories in existing case law that could be extended to media
regulation, rather than creating a new First Amendment interest. An

Managing Director, Office of Communication, Inc., United Church of Christ and an
adjunct lecturer at Georgetown University in the Communications Culture and Technology
program. The ideas in this Article are solely her own.
1. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1666 (1967).
2. Id. at 1678.
3. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416
(1986).
4. See id. at 1418.
*
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opportunity to do this arises from existing case law regarding a
"heckler's veto." Heckler's veto cases typically consider the appropriate
behavior of local law enforcement when a crowd or individual threatens
hostile action in response to a demonstration or speaker.5 In these cases,
the First Amendment grants a positive right to the speaker: the local
government must take action to protect the speaker against a hostile
crowd.6 The courts do not allow local law enforcement to accede to a
heckler's veto.7
The possibility that the legal tradition surrounding a heckler's veto
might be applicable in this area was raised-but rejected-by Professor
Owen Fiss in his 1986 article Free Speech and Social Structure.8 In his
article, he rejected the heckler's veto approach as insufficient when
compared with a listener's right to receive information. 9 Although
Professor Fiss is correct that a First Amendment interpretation focused
on listeners would be more likely to produce enhanced democratic
discourse, the failure of the Court to adopt such a test, or to even profess
interest in it, means that other legal theories must be considered. In
contrast to Fiss' and Barron's approach, the current validity of the
heckler's veto cases is unquestioned.
As described in detail below, heckler's veto cases are helpful
because they illustrate the fundamental conflict between two members of
the public with competing speech goals and the role of the state in
promoting the dissemination of messages. Heckler's veto cases justify
compelling (and prohibiting) state action to promote the First
Amendment goal of disseminating unpopular views. Heckler's veto
cases recognize that it is important for conflicting speakers to have
access to the same audience or crowd. Heckler's veto cases do not
permit the state to hide behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions
of the public in order to silence a speaker.
All these elements are missing from present mass media
jurisprudence. Currently, the government has no obligation to act to
promote speech. Except in rare cases, speakers do not have a right to
access the same audience as an electronic speaker with whom they
disagree. 10 And media outlets are free to reject advertising on the
grounds that the public will have an adverse reaction. The values
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id. at 1416-17.
Seeid. at1417.
Id.
Id. at 1416-18.
Id.
at 1417.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18 (1993).
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underlying heckler's veto cases would render a dramatic change in mass
media First Amendment jurisprudence.
On the other hand, it may not be easy to draw a simple and direct
parallel between heckler's veto cases and the mass media context. Most
importantly, all heckler's veto cases occur on publicly owned land and
thus draw on public forum analysis. The private ownership of a speaking
location has long been problematic for First Amendment analysis when
the government is not the entity interfering with speech. 1 Also limiting
is the focus in this line of cases on avoiding violence. The heckler's veto
cases are an outgrowth of the fighting words doctrine, which creates a
narrow exception to the First Amendment for words that are so vile as to
"incite an immediate breach of the peace." 12 Outside of the small
exception for fighting words, the heckler's veto doctrine holds.' 3 Thus,
the obligation of the state to protect a speaker is engendered by the
state's police power to prevent and regulate violence. Violence is never
an issue in modem mass media cases; thus it may be more difficult to
demand action by the government.
Given these aspects, there are two possible uses for the heckler's
veto concept. First, it could be used as a tool to critique the failure of
broadcasters to air controversial advertisements, and to possibly allow
direct responses to controversial advertisements. While this is a more
limited use than a broad-scale revision of our interpretation of the First
Amendment, it could be extremely useful. As in the landmark case Reno
v. A CL U,14 the concept of a heckler's veto can be persuasive because the
idea is so firmly entrenched in legal thinking, even if a full legal analogy
does not hold.'

5

Second, advocates might be able to circumvent the state action
problem by attributing the whole communications regulatory and
ownership structure to state action, rather than viewing state action
narrowly as only when the state acts to directly suppress speech. Such an
approach is advocated by Cass Sunstein.' 6 While this approach is
11.Since the Supreme Court concluded in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes that a candidate debate sponsored by a state-owned public broadcaster is not a public forum,
the application of the public forum doctrine to broadcasting is limited. 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
12. See Cohen v. California, 402 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942); see also Mark A. Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's
Veto?, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (1979) (tracing the connection between the fighting words doctrine
and the heckler's veto doctrine).
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
14. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
15. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
16. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 36-38.
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007
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theoretically sound and very appealing, it does suffer from some of the
flaws of Barron's approach-which is that currently it is unlikely to be
adopted by the courts.
II.

HECKLER'S VETO CASE LAW

The relevance of heckler's veto case law lies in its strong
commitment to fulfilling the First Amendment's ultimate goal of
allowing viewpoints to be expressed, even when violence is in the
offing. As the cases below demonstrate, in heckler's veto cases the
courts have required the state to ensure dissemination of clashing and
unpopular views. 17 Heckler's veto cases do not permit the state to hide
behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the public in order to
silence a speaker. Heckler's veto cases also recognize that it is important
for competing speakers to have access to the same audience or crowd.
The heckler's veto doctrine grew out of the seminal doctrine of
"clear and present danger." The credit for originating the concept of an
impermissible "heckler's veto" is given to Justice Black in his dissent in
Feiner v. New York,' 8 although the First Amendment scholar H.K.
Kalven gave this doctrine its catchy name.19
Feiner v. New York contains all the elements of every classic
heckler's veto case. In 1949 in Syracuse, New York, Mr. Irving Feiner
was speaking to a crowd of black and white people.20 Mr. Feiner was
allegedly encouraging the African-Americans in the crowd to take up
arms against whites to secure their civil rights and was hurling insults at
a wide range of public figures, including the President and the mayor of
Syracuse. 21 The police determined that a fight was about to break out
among the members of the crowd. Consequently, they asked Mr. Feiner
to stop speaking and to ask the crowd to disperse.22 When he refused, the
police arrested him.2 3 He was convicted of breaching the peace and
failing to obey a police officer.2 4
As in many First Amendment cases, the original First Amendment
speaker did not prevail. The Supreme Court upheld Feiner's conviction

17. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-6 (1949).
18. 340 U.S. 315, 326-29 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Fiss, supra note 3, at 141617.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Fiss,supra note 3, at 1416.
Feiner,340 U.S. at 316.
Id.at317.
Id.at317-18.
Id.at318.
Id. at 318-20.
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under the clear and present danger doctrine because, in the trial court's
view, "a clear danger of disorder was threatened., 25 The lower court also
concluded that there was no evidence "that the acts of the police were a
cover for suppression of petitioner's views and opinions., 2 6 Over time,
however, this case has been limited to the grounds found by the
majority, that the speaker was indeed inciting the crowd to riot and
inadequate means were available to keep the peace, 7 although the
minority disputed vehemently that characterization of the facts, and as a
* 28
consequence would not have upheld Feiner's conviction.
Decisions upholding the state's obligation to protect controversial
speakers fully embrace the goal of developing a rich marketplace of
ideas. In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, a case that precedes Feinerbut
is quoted by many heckler's veto cases, Justice Douglas spoke for the
majority in striking down an overly broad interpretation of a breach of
the peace statute.29 In that case, a speaker who incited great public
response was convicted of creating a breach of the peace. 30 The law was
interpreted to prohibit any action that "'stirs the public to anger, invites
31
dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance."'
Justice Douglas explained that "a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute." 32 "The vitality of civil and
political institutions in our society depends on free discussion ....

[I]t is

only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government
remains responsive to the will of the people ....

The right to speak

freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of
the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. 3 3
by
"[T]he alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either
34
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.,

25. Id. at 319.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the plaintiff's right to express her views was entitled to constitutional protection, since unlike
the speech at issue in Feiner,the expression did not go beyond mere persuasion).
28. Feiner,340 U.S. at 321-23 (Black, J., dissenting). All of the dissenting justices, including
Douglas, agreed that the decision would allow "a simple and readily available technique by which
cities and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or otherwise ... to the supervision
and censorship of the local police." Id. at 323.
29. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

30. Id. at 2-3.
31. Id. at 3 (quoting the lower court's jury instructions).
32.
33.

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Id.

34. Id. at 4-5.
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Similarly, in Forsyth County v. NationalistMovement, the Supreme
Court held that "[1]isteners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation., 35 The Court explained that "[s]peech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob. 36 In this case, the county
had adopted an ordinance allowing an administrative official to set the
fee for a parade . or protest based on the likely cost of policing that
event. 37 The Court found this would necessarily be regulating speech
based on content.38
Even more on point are district court cases involving equitable
relief, because those cases require that the city take action to promote
free speech. 39 For example, Dunlap v. City of Chicago addressed an
ongoing controversy over a pro-Martin Luther King, Jr. march that often
faced a violent response every year that it was held.40 The district court
judge granted an injunction not only requiring the city to grant the
protesters a right to march, but also ordered the city to "provide police in
such numbers as in their professional judgment are required to afford
adequate protection to plaintiffs., 4 1 After the march occurred, but with
significant violence despite the court's order granting police protection,
the district court concluded that the plaintiff marchers were allowed to
bring a Section 1983 claim against the police officers for failure to
provide adequate protection.4 2
A similar example is Glasson v. City of Louisville, in which a
protestor observing President Nixon's motorcade route held up a sign
asking the President to "[1]ead us to hate and kill poverty, disease and
ignorance, not each other., 43 A police officer had earlier in the day been
instructed to "destroy any sign or poster that was 'detrimental' or
'injurious' to the President. ... The judge noted that this protester was

35.

505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).

36. Id. at 134-35 (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 124.
38. Id. at 137; see also id. at 140-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (mentioning heckler's veto).
39. Dunlap v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cottonreader v.
Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Ala. 1966) ("[S]uppression by public officials or police of

the rights of free speech and assembly cannot be made an easy substitute for the performance of
their duty to maintain order by taking such steps as may be reasonably necessary and feasible to
protect peaceable, orderly speakers, marchers or demonstrators in the exercise of their rights against
violent or disorderly retaliation or attack at the hands of those who may disagree and object.").
40. Dunlap,435 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
41. Id. at 1297.

42. Id. at 1298.
43. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1975).
44. Id.
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making her views known "in a manner often used by persons who do not
have access to the print or broadcast media." 45 "A police officer has the
duty not to ratify and effectuate a heckler's veto nor may he join a
moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take
reasonable action to protect from violence persons exercising their
constitutional rights."' 46 In this case, despite the presence of twenty-five
to thirty hecklers, the court found that seven to twelve police officers
could have called for reinforcements and that the destruction of the
poster was not done in good faith. 47 The action of the police "exhibit[ed]
shocking disregard of her right to have her person and property protected
from violence at the hands of persons in disagreement with
by the state
48
ideas."
her
In case after case, Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court
emphasize that the role of the state is to promote speech despite hostile
circumstances. 49 Although these cases forcefully protect speech, they do
not hold that the state's obligation to promote speech is boundless. In all
the cases, the courts take pains to make clear that the duty to protect a
speaker faced with a hostile mob will fail once the situation becomes
truly dangerous. "[T]he law does not expect or require them to defend
the right of a speaker to address a hostile audience, however large and
unreasonably subject them to violent
intemperate, when to do so would
50
injury."
physical
retaliation and
The cases described above hold that the state has a serious, but not
boundless, obligation to protect and promote unpopular speech in the
traditional heckler's veto case. However, perhaps more powerful is the
concept of a heckler's veto in the mind of many jurists. For example, an
extremely helpful use of the term heckler's veto occurs in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Reno v. ACLU, the case in which the Supreme Court
definitively granted full First Amendment protection to the Internet. 5' In
45. Id. at 905.
46. Id.at 906.
47. Id. at 902.
48. Id. at 911.
49. See, e.g., Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2005) ("'[D]oes it
follow that the police may silence the rabble-rousing speaker? Not at all. The police must permit the
speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler's veto."' (quoting Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993))); Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 37 (6th
Cir. 1973) ("[S]tate officials are not entitled to rely on community hostility as an excuse not to
protect, by inaction or affirmative conduct, the exercise of fundamental rights."); see also Gider v.
Abramson, 994 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Ky. 1998) ("The police were not at liberty to do
nothing; authorities had to develop some way of allowing the rallies to proceed .....
50. Glasson, 518 F.2d at 909.
51. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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this case, the Court used an analogy with a heckler's veto, without
requiring that the case before it include all the elements of a classic
heckler's veto case. In this case, the Court considered and rejected a
number of the government's arguments in support of the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). 52 One portion of the CDA
outlawed transmission of proscribed content if the sender had knowledge
that a "specific person" was under 18 years of age. 3 The Court found
this portion of the statute unacceptable, in part because "[i]t would
confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a 'heckler's veto,'
upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on [to a
chat room or other Internet forum] and inform the would-be discoursers
that his 17-year-old child-a 'specific person ...under 18 years of age,'
would be present. 54
This use of the concept of a heckler's veto in this case shows the
power of the idea in the mass media context. In this case, the Court did
not require any specific state action to see an analogy with a heckler's
veto. Instead, the Court found that by merely enacting a law proscribing
certain types of private conduct, Congress could empower a private
party to stop constitutionally-protected speech.
III. APPLICATION OF HECKLER'S VETO TO CONTROVERSIAL SPEECH

In contrast to other areas of First Amendment law, the Supreme
Court has permitted the federal government to take action to ensure that
all speakers are heard on the broadcast spectrum.55 Despite this proactive
role for the government to protect First Amendment rights in
broadcasting, the current state of affairs for broadcasting is nonetheless
inadequate to promote a truly dynamic marketplace of ideas. Most
important, there is no obligation on the part of the government to protect
the digital "heckler." There is no obligation that a controversial speaker
be allowed to speak on the broadcast spectrum. At most, the government
is permitted to take action to promote speech, but is not obligated to do
so. The analogy in a heckler's veto case would be a situation where
police officers were permitted to protect a controversial speaker, but
were 6not obligated to do so. As illustrated above, this is clearly not the
law.

52.

Id. at 864-68.

53.

See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidatedby Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

54. Reno, 521 U.S. at 880 (internal citation omitted).
55. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1968).
56. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1968); Glasson v. City of
Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905-06, 907-10 (6th Cir. 1975); Dunlap v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp.
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In contrast, a critical element of the heckler's veto is the obligation
of the state not to allow public opposition to shut down a speaker. But
today broadcasters frequently act in exactly this manner-they refuse to
sell advertising time to a member of the public because of the
controversial nature of the advertisement. While broadcasters are not
permitted to deny political candidates advertising time because the
advertisement is controversial, no other speaker has received such
protection from Congress and the courts. A classic example of the
refusal to sell advertising time was the inability of the United Church of
Christ ("UCC") to buy time to air its message in 2004. 57 The UCC is a
mainline Protestant denomination with over 1.3 million members
nationwide that was engaged in a national identity campaign to draw
individuals to its congregations.5 8
In its campaign, UCC sought to spread a message of "extravagant
welcome" to a wide array of members of the public-specifically
demographic segments that might traditionally be considered
unwelcome in church. To this end, UCC developed an allegorical
advertisement called "Night Club." In Night Club, two muscular, blackclad bouncers guard velvet ropes at the doors of a church, admitting
more socially acceptable worshippers but turning away worshippers
from more marginalized groups. 59 The screen goes black, and then the
text conveys a simple message about the UCC: "Jesus didn't turn people
away. Neither do we."60 Music begins, the screen turns to shots of a
happy, unified, diverse group, and an unseen speaker announces: "The
you are, or where you are on
United Church of Christ-no matter who
61
here.,
welcome
are
you
life's journey,
1295, 1298, 1301 (N.D. 111.1977). The great flaw of many attempts to reform FCC policy is their

necessary reliance on the FCC's power to regulate. But if political winds change, and the FCC
concludes that a particular policy promoting the diversity of voices is no longer appropriate, nothing

in current jurisprudence can stop the FCC from making such a decision. See Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656, 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R.
5047-48 (1987); see also Cheryl Leanza & Harold Feld, How Can Government Constitutionally
Compel Mass Media to Provide News, and How Can Citizens Make It Happen?, in NEWS

INCORPORATED 185, 185-212 (Elliot D. Cohen ed., 2005) (promoting a law that would obligate the
FCC's action in these cases).
57. See In re NBC Telemundo License Co., Petition to Deny Renewal (petition date Dec. 9,
2004) (file no. BRCT - 20041001ABM) at 1, 5-7; In re CBS Television Stations, Inc., Petition to

Deny Renewal (petition date Dec. 9, 2004) (file no. BRCT- 20041001AJQ) at 4-7.
58. In re CBS Stations, Inc., Petition to Deny Renewal (petition date Dec. 9, 2004) (file no.
BRCT - 20041001AJQ) at 2.
59. Advertisement: Bouncers, http://www.stillspeaking.com/media (follow "Download The
Ads" hyperlink; then follow "Bouncers" hyperlink under "View Television Commercials").

60. Id.
61.

Id.
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UCC sought to buy advertising time on several broadcast networks,
as opposed to buying from each local affiliate, as it is far more costeffective to buy network time. NBC refused to air the advertisement on
its network, claiming it was "too controversial. 6 2 CBS refused for a
slightly different reason, claiming the advertisement addressed "one side
of a current controversial issue of public importance ...this commercial
touches on the exclusion of gay couples and other minority groups. 63
Thus, in this case, the networks were able to shut down speech
specifically because it was controversial. The result of this decisionmaking, enabled by the current regulatory structure of broadcast
regulation, was to ensure that some viewpoints will not be disseminated
in this country. And this instance is but one application of typical
broadcaster policies prohibiting ads on controversial topics. Viewed in
the context of heckler's veto cases, where only the threat of violence can
shut down controversial-even vile-speech, broadcasting law seems
out of touch with First Amendment precepts. It is difficult to reconcile a
decision to refuse advertisement because it is controversial with the
words in Terminiello: "[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. 6 4
While it would be appropriate to prohibit a broadcaster from
refusing to air speech because it is controversial, this does not imply that
broadcasters must accept all advertising. For example, such a prohibition
would continue to recognize that broadcasters have an appropriate role
in evaluating advertising for taste, and to channel some advertisements
to appropriate time slots accordingly. 65 Rationales grounded on
inappropriate terms and graphics would certainly be appropriate for
advertising. But rationales grounded in the discomfort of the audience
because of the ideas the advertising contains should not be permitted.
As the cases regarding heckler's vetoes hold, "hostile public
reaction does not cause the forfeiture of the constitutional protection
afforded a speaker's message so long as the speaker does not go beyond
mere persuasion and advocacy of ideas and attempts to incite to riot.

66

In addition to heckler's veto cases centering on the value of
controversial speech, in some instances, these cases show the importance
62.

See In re NBC Telemundo License Co., supra note 57, at Attachment A, Exhibit 1.

63. Id. at Attachment A, Exhibit 2.
64.

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

65.

Cf Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding a political candidate's

right to broadcast graphic material that did not rise to the level of indecency at any time of day

because candidates receive special protection under Sections 312(a)(7) and 315(a) of the
Communications Act).

66. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1975).
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of allowing two competing views to be presented at the same time to the
same audience. Drawing on these cases could provide a counterpoint to
those who argue that media diversity need not be pursued because of the
significant number of outlets available in the modem mass media. These
cases contain an inherent recognition that presentation of multiple points
of view at the same time and place are in furtherance of the First
Amendment.
For example, in Grider v. Abramson,67 the Klu Klux Klan and a
"Unity Rally" were scheduled at the same time and general location in
downtown Louisville. The court clearly recognized that the opportunity
to speak in the same vicinity was a core portion of the First Amendment
right being protected. The court praised the city for making an extensive
effort to allow the two competing protests to occur at the same time.6 8
The court concluded that "[c]hanging the time or place of either rally
would have reduced the threat of violence but also would have been
more restrictive and inconsistent with the goal of fostering public
debate.... [A] debate is more vigorous when the opponent is within
range .

,69 Part of the complaint against the city took issue with the

city's decision to separate the two protests with fencing and buffer
zones. Rather than criticize the separation, the court based its evaluation
of the city's behavior on its effectiveness in promoting debate: "[T]he
separation would probably encourage the debate, rather than inhibit it
[because the separation would quell violence]. 7 0
Interestingly, this court carefully considered a related claimwhether speakers not associated with either rally should be permitted to
speak. The court concluded: "Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to talk
over or shout down the rally speakers. Allowing individuals to drown
out the message of lawful speakers would diminish, rather than affirm,
the right of free speech., 71 This subtlety draws a contrast between
private citizens stopping others from speaking and private citizens who
choose to respond to one another. Speakers who obtain a permit and
organize a rally can respond to another rally, while speakers who simply
want to drown out others are not permitted. But under this well-reasoned
ruling, neither a private actor nor a city may eliminate speech because it
is controversial. The beauty of the court's analysis in Grider is that the

67.
68.
69.

994 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
Id. at 845.
Id.

70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 848.
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opinion focused on increasing the amount of thoughtful debate at each
turn.
This right of direct response is recognized in at least one area of
FCC rules. Under these rules, political candidates are given "equal
opportunities. 72 If one candidate in a particular election receives
advertising time, competing candidates are guaranteed the right to also
obtain time.73 In these circumstances, broadcasters are obligated to give
political candidates access to a similar audience demographic.74 They are
not allowed to relegate the response to "broadcasting Siberia. 75
In heckler's veto cases, controversy is recognized as the defining
characteristic of speech that must be protected. The ability to debate
directly with one's opponent is often enshrined as the most important
element under consideration. In current mass media law, in contrast,
controversy is an acceptable reason to silence a speaker. And large
corporations that own broadcast networks with the power to prohibit
certain ideas from reaching the public are given as much protection
under the First Amendment as small pamphleteers on the village green
in the 1700s. The analysis of the First Amendment in modem mass
media law cannot be reconciled with the robust public debate enshrined
in heckler's veto cases.
IV. STATE ACTION PROBLEM

Exploration of this matter raises the question of private action
rather than state action in First Amendment debates. The First
Amendment prohibits only government intervention with free speech.76
In heckler's veto cases, speech is occurring on public ground. In the
mass media, in contrast, the law considers speech on broadcast
frequencies or cable channels to be occurring on private property.77
In his book, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, Cass
Sunstein proposes a constitutional theory of the First Amendment which
he calls a "New Deal" for speech, which can help resolve the state action
problem.78 He bases his theory on the change in constitutional

72. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (2006).
73. Id.
74. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941(e) (2006).
75. Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
77. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). This conclusion is
ironic given the broadcast spectrum is clearly owned by the United States government, not the
individual FCC licensees.
78. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 34-38.
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understanding that occurred during the New Deal era.79 Sunstein
explains that in the 1930s, the Constitution was "understood as a
constraint on government 'regulation,' just as it is now with respect to
free speech., 80 At the time, the Supreme Court believed that the
government must be "neutral" as between employers and employees.
Under this theory, it would invalidate minimum wage laws, for
example. 8'
However, as Sunstein points out, this conclusion hinged upon an
understanding that the existing power distributions were somehow
sacrosanct.8 2 The New Deal reformers persuaded the Supreme Court
that, in Franklin Roosevelt's words, "'economic laws are not made by
nature. They are made by human beings.",, 83 In other words, the
distribution of power via the commercial market is not natural and
deserving of protection from the government. Instead, it is a direct
product of the government through the enforcement of existing laws.
Property rights and tort law gave employers certain rights vis-a-vis
employees. So-called government "intervention" eventually was
understood, not as intervention, but as a recalibration of a governmentproduced system of rights. 84 Ironically, exactly this contrast was noted
by Jerome Barron himself in his article forty years ago.85
Thus, under Lochner, the government was able to enact minimum
wage laws and the change was not understood to be the government
taking away power that employers were naturally entitled to, but instead
was understood as the government recalibrating the rights it previously
granted to employers. If the government is the source of employers'
power in the first place, its reallocation of power cannot be considered
an impermissible tampering. The government, in this account, is part of
the initial power allocation.
The analogy to free speech in this country is clear. The freedom and
power currently granted to newspapers, broadcasters, cable companies
and other speakers is a direct result of the government's allocation of
79.

See id. at 34.

80. Id. at 29.
81.

Id.

82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 30 (citation omitted).

84.

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 31-43.

85.

See Barron, supra note 1, at 1643 (noting that Holmes was a great advocate of the

marketplace of ideas in free speech, but "reminded his brethren in Lochner v. New York that the
Constitution was not 'intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire,' nevertheless rather uncritically

accepted the view that constitutional status should be given to a free market theory in the realm of
ideas") (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).
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rights through FCC and Congressional decision-making and through
Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is not a sacrosanct right that may never
be violated. Instead, the government would merely be recalibrating
power among one set of speakers-who were previously favored-and
another set of speakers (predominately comprised of listeners) who
would receive more rights. In Sunstein's words, "[s]peaker autonomy,
made possible as it is by law, may not promote constitutional purposes"
in all circumstances.8 6
Sunstein's theory is a natural fit with the heckler's veto cases.
Sunstein notes that his theory has particular support in the heckler's veto
law because current law protects the positive right of receiving
government protection in order to speak, as contrasted with the more
Amendment right not to be censored or thwarted by the
traditional First
87
government.
In fact, the current public forum doctrine implies that the
government owes members of the public a right to speak. The
government must offer a reasonable venue to engage in the desired
speech, and it may not prohibit all speech on certain land. 88 The
government may not withhold a parade permit or refuse to grant other
permits unless there are "ample alternative channels of
communication." 89 The difference in this case is that the government
owns the property where the speech occurs. But nevertheless, the courts
require a proactive effort by the government in the face of would-be
speakers. 90
Under Sunstein's theory, the current regulation of mass media is
sufficient to meet the state action requirement of the First Amendment.
Congress and the FCC have granted to broadcasters, cablecasters and
other media outlets the power to reach vast audiences and the power to
exclude others. 9 1 The affirmative government involvement in the modem
mass media is much more direct and obvious than the common law of
property and tort eventually acknowledged as government action in the
New Deal era. The range of rights granted in media regulation is
86. SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 34; see also id. at 34-38 (theorizing that government
regulation should not always be dismissed as constitutionally impermissible, and in certain
circumstances, may actually promote free speech).
87. See id. at 46-48.
88. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
89.

Id.

90. For an alternative solution to circumvent the state action problem, see Rory Lancman,
Protecting Speech from Private Abridgment: Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 Sw. U. L.
REV. 223 (1996).
91. See supra Part Ill.
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extensive. Beyond receiving licenses, virtually all media outlets are
granted various protections in intellectual property, technology
regulation, and government subsidy.92 Congress should be able to
conclude that these protections ought to be balanced through additional
rights granted to controversial (or any) speakers.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ironically, this Article began in search of a legal theory that would
be more palatable to the courts than a broadscale reinterpretation of the
First Amendment along the lines proposed by Jerome Barron forty years
ago. To some degree, this effort was successful. A parallel between
broadcasters who refuse to air controversial advertisements is plausible
and could be helpful in current litigation. The terse rejection by private
media owners of advertising that might be controversial is embarrassing
in contrast with the efforts required of police departments to risk life and
limb to promote debate in the face of violence. In the end, however, to
reach beyond that scenario, the heckler's veto theory must turn to a
different, but no less radical, rethinking of the fundamental concept upon
which current First Amendment law is based. While Cass Sunstein's
approach to the First Amendment is solid, it is unlikely to be taken up in
the near term by the Supreme Court.
Thus, heckler's veto cases are useful, but hardly a silver bullet.
Advocates can cite to the concept of a heckler's veto as an easily
understood and accepted concept of First Amendment law. The language
in these cases is a soaring testament to the importance of airing
conflicting views, in situations much more dire than the typical mass
media advertising buy. The analogy can help point out to courts, as it did
in Reno v. A CLU, that one private actor is stopping the speech of another
private actor with the state's assistance. However, the heckler's veto
cases also come up against the core limitation of the First Amendment as
it is currently interpreted. The Constitution says "Congress shall make
no law ...abridging the freedom of speech. 9 3 Until congressional

action in this context is not limited to direct government action, the
92. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 688 (1994) (upholding
must-carry regulations); Costa de Oro Television, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.3d 123, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(noting that the Cable Act "gives a broadcaster the option of cable carriage under a retransmission

consent provision that permits the broadcaster and the cable operator to negotiate cable carriage
arrangements" in exchange for compensation); Satellite Broad. & Comm. Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d
337, 343 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing the "carry one, carry all" rule); KCST-TV, Inc. v. FCC, 699
F.2d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing network non-duplication rules).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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democratic discourse goals of the First Amendment are not likely to be
fully realized.
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